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Abstract
We study the effects of the presence of contrarians in an agent-based model of competing popula-
tions. Contrarians are common in societies. These contrarians are agents who deliberately prefer to
hold an opinion that is contrary to the prevailing idea of the commons or normal agents. Contrari-
ans are introduced within the context of the Minority Game (MG), which is a binary model for an
evolving and adaptive population of agents competing for a limited resource. Results of numerical
simulations reveal that the average success rate among the agents depends non-monotonically on
the fraction ac of contrarians. For small ac, the contrarians systematically outperform the normal
agents by avoiding the crowd effect and enhance the overall success rate. For high ac, the anti-
persistent nature of the MG is disturbed and the few normal agents outperform the contrarians.
Qualitative discussion and analytic results for the small ac and high ac regimes are also presented,
and the crossover behavior between the two regimes is discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In real-life societies, there always exist some people, referred to as “contrarians”, who
deliberately prefer to take on an opinion contradictory to the prevailing thoughts of others.
Contrarian investment strategies, for example, have been an active and important subject
of studies in finances [1, 2]. Besides financial markets, effects of the existence of contrarians
have also been studied recently within the context of the dynamics of opinion formation in
social systems [3, 4]. In the present work, we explore how contrarians may affect the global
features in one of the most popular agent-based models in recent year, namely the Minority
Game (MG) [5]. The MG is a binary version of the type of problems related to the bar-
attendance problem proposed by Arthur [6]. It has become the basic model of competing
populations with built-in adaptive behavior [7]. On the application side, it has been shown
that the MG can be suitably generalized to model financial markets and reproduce the
so-called stylized facts observed in real markets [8, 9].
In the basic MG, an odd number N of agents decide between two possible choices, say, 0
or 1, at each timestep. The winners are those belonging to the minority group. The winning
outcome can, therefore, be represented by a single digit: 0 or 1, according to the winning
option. The most recent m winning outcomes constitute the only information that is made
available to all agents. The agents decide based on this global information. For given
m, there are 2m possible m-bit history bit-strings, leading to a strategy space consisting
of a total of 22
m
possible strategies. Each strategy gives a prediction of either 1 or 0 for
each of the 2m histories. Initially, each agent picks s strategies at random, with repetitions
allowed. The performance of the strategies is recorded by assigning (deducting) one (virtual)
point to the strategies which would have predicted the correct (incorrect) outcome, after the
outcome is known in a timestep. At each timestep, each agent follows the prediction of the
momentarily best-performing strategy, i.e., the one with the highest virtual points among
her s strategies. Therefore, a feedback mechanism is built in by allowing the agents to adapt
to past performance, which in turn is related to the actions of the agents themselves, by
shifting from one strategy to another.
Despite the simplicity of the model, the MG shows very rich and non-trivial properties
[10, 11, 12]. A quantity of interest, for example, is the standard deviation σ in the number of
agents making a particular decision, averaged over different runs. This quantity characterizes
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the collective efficiency of the system in that a small σ implies a higher success rate or
winning probability per agent and hence more winners per turn. Most noticeably, σ exhibits
a non-monotonic behavior on m [10, 13, 14], showing a minimum at which the performance
of the system is better than that of a system in which the agents decide randomly. This
feature can readily be explained in terms of the crowd-anticrowd theory of Johnson and
coworkers [15, 16]. If the number of strategies in the whole strategy pool is smaller than the
total number of strategies in play, many agents will hold identical strategies. With decisions
based on the best-performing strategies, many agents will then make identical decisions and
form a “crowd”. For small m, σ is large due to the lack of a cancellation effect from a
corresponding “anti-crowd” of agents using the opposite or anti-correlated strategy. This
small m regime is referred to as the informationally efficient phase, as there is no information
in the history bit-strings that the agents can exploit [10]. In the large m limit, however,
the strategy pool is much larger than the number of strategies in play. Thus it is unlikely
that a strategy is being used by more than one agent, and the best performing strategies are
those not in play among the agents. In this case, the agents behave as if they are deciding
independently and randomly, leading to σ ∼ √N/2. The minimum value of σ occurs at
around 2 ·2m ∼ Ns, where the size of the crowd and anti-crowd become comparable [15, 16].
An important and interesting question is whether the collective efficiency in MG can be
optimized and how, especially in the efficient regime of the system. A few modified versions
of the MG have been proposed and studied, with an enhanced performance to different
extent [17, 18, 19, 20]. In the present work, we show that a population consisting of a small
fraction of agents with contrarian character, i.e., agents who act opposite to the prediction
of their own best-performing strategies, will have the standard deviation highly suppressed
and hence the performance of the population greatly improved. The plan of the paper is
as follows. In Sec. II, we present our model and define the action of the contrarians. In
Sec. III, we present results of extensive numerical simulations, together with qualitative
discussion and analytic results on the behavior in the limits of small and large fractions of
contrarians. The crossover behavior between the two limits is also discussed. Section IV
summarizes the present work.
3
II. MINORITY GAME WITH CONTRARIANS
We consider a system of an odd number N of agents, including Nn normal agents and Nc
contrarians, competing for a limited resource. At each timestep, each agent must choose one
of two options, 0 or 1. The winners are those belonging to the minority group and a winner is
awarded one (real) point for each winning action. The only information available to all agents
is the history bit-strings recording the most recent m winning outcomes (i.e., the minority
sides). For a given value of m, there are 2m possible histories. A strategy gives a prediction
for each of the 2m histories, and therefore the whole strategy pool has 22
m
strategies in total.
Initially, each agent randomly picks s strategies from the strategy pool, with repetitions
allowed. After each timestep, each strategy is assessed for its performance by rewarding one
(virtual) point (VP) to the strategy if it has predicted the winning option. The VPs thus
reflect the cumulative performance of the strategies that an agent holds from the beginning of
a run. At each timestep, each agent makes use of the momentarily best-performing strategy,
i.e., the one with the highest VP, in her procession for decision. A random tie-breaking rule
is used in case of tied VPs. However, normal agents and contrarians use the best-performing
strategies in different ways. For a normal agent, she follows the predictions of the best-
performing strategy. For a contrarian, however, she takes the opposite (hence the name
contrarian) action to the prediction of her best-performing strategies, i.e., if the strategy
with the highest VP says 0, for example, a contrarian will choose option 1. Note that the
assignment of VPs to strategies does not depend on the type of agents under consideration.
For a contrarian, for example, if she loses in a timestep, her best-performing strategy has
actually predicted the correct outcome and hence a VP will be rewarded.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
We have performed extensive numerical simulations to study the effects of the presence of
contrarians in MG. Typically, we consider systems of N = 101 agents, with s = 2 strategies
per agent. Each run lasts for 104 timesteps and each data point represents an average over
the results of 50 independent runs of different initial distributions of strategies and initial
histories in starting the runs. Figure 1(a) shows the averaged success rate R over all the
agents, which is the number of real points per agent per turn, as a function of the parameter
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m, for different fractions of contrarians ac = Nc/N in the system. For ac = 0, our model
reduces to the MG. The results show that, for small m corresponding to the efficient phase
of the basic MG, and for small ac, R increases as ac increases. For about ac = 0.2-0.3, R
achieves a maximum value of about 0.485 at m = 4. Note that by definition the highest
value of R is (N − 1)/2N . The effects of contrarians are also reflected in the averaged
standard deviation σ (see Figure 1(b)), which drops sensitively with ac for small values of
ac in the efficient phase. In the absence of contrarians, σ shows a minimum at about m = 6
for the size of system considered [10]. In the presence of contrarians, the minimum in σ
now occurs at m = 4, with a suppressed value of σ when compared with the basic MG.
The success rate and σ are related in that a smaller σ implies more winners per turn and
hence a larger success rate [21]. The results in Fig. 1, therefore, indicate that the presence
of a small fraction of contrarians enhances the collective performance of the system in the
efficient phase (small m) of the MG.
As the key feature of improved performance occurs at small values of m, we will focus
in this regime from now on. Figure 2 summarizes the dependence of the averaged success
rate R on the fraction of contrarians ac, for m = 2, 3, 4. For small ac, R increases sensitively
with ac, and achieves a maximum at some value of ac. We have checked that this value
of ac tends to increase towards 1/2 as the number of agents N in the system increases.
The maximum value of R and the fraction ac for achieving the maximal R are both m-
dependent. An overall maximal value of R ≈ 0.485 occurs at m = 4 and ac ≈ 0.25-0.3,
for systems with N = 101. For large ac, R decreases as ac increases and the corresponding
values of R become less sensitive to m. It is also interesting to investigate the success rates
averaged over the normal agents and averaged over the contrarians separately, to see how
the averaged results in Fig.2 comes about. Figure 3 shows the results for m = 2, which
are typical of the small m cases shown in Fig.2. The results indicate that a small fraction
of contrarians can systematically take advantage of the background normal agents, as the
contrarians have a success rate that is significantly higher than 1/2, while the normal agents
basically take on a constant success rate corresponding to that of the basic MG with the
same value of m. However, as the fraction of contrarians becomes large, it is the remaining
few normal agents who take advantage of the contrarians and attain a success rate of about
0.7, while the contrarians only have a success rate of about 0.25. A crossover between these
two regimes occurs at an intermediate fraction of ac ≈ 0.36 for m = 2 and N = 101 where
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the success rates of the two types of agents are comparable.
The behavior for a small fraction of contrarians can be readily understood within the
physically transparent crowd-anticrowd picture of the MG [15, 16]. For a small fraction of
contrarians, the winning outcomes and hence the strategies’s VPs are still dominated by
the behavior of the normal agents. Therefore, the behavior of the system basically follows
that of the basic MG. For the present model, the most important point to realize is the
anti-persistent nature of the system, i.e., there is no runaway VPs for the strategies [12].
In other words, strategies that have predicted the correct (incorrect) outcomes in recent
turns are bound to predict incorrectly (correctly) in future turns. This leads to the so-called
doubly periodic behavior in the outcomes [12] as it takes the system about 2 · 2m timesteps
to pass through an Eulerean trail in the history space formed by all the 2m possible histories
[22, 23]. For small m, the number of strategies in play is larger than the total number of
strategies, implying an appreciate overlap of strategies among the agents. The lower success
rate of the normal agents (see Fig.3) comes about from the crowd effect, i.e., a group of
agents using the same or similar better-performing strategies for decision at a timestep. For
small m, this crowd is too big to win. A low success rate (relative to (N − 1)/2N) or a
large σ implies that there is a room for more winners per turn. A contrarian, by taking the
opposite action of the prediction of the best-performing strategy that she holds, is given the
ability to avoid herself from joining the crowd and win more frequently than the minority
rule allows. This breaking away from the crowd has the effect of allowing more winners per
turn and hence suppressing the standard deviation (see Fig.1(b)). It is worth noting that
several variations of the MG also give an enhanced success rate under some condition. For
example, the presence of a fraction of agents who decide based on a larger value of m in
a background of agents using a smaller value of m also gives rise to an enhanced overall
success rate [21]. Another way of breaking away from the crowd is to allow some agents to
opt out of a MG at random timesteps [24]. Quantitatively, one expects that in the large N
limit, since the N(1 − ac) normal agents have a success rate R = R(ac = 0) ≡ R(0) and
the outcomes are dominated by the normal agents for small ac, the Nac contrarians have a
success rate of 1 − R(0). Averaging over the normal and contrarian agents gives a success
rate R(ac) = R(0) + ac(1− 2R(0)), which is a good approximation of the numerical results
in Fig.2 for small ac. Note that R(0) is m-dependent, due to the better crowd-anticrowd
cancellation effect asm increases. The value of R(0) can be obtained by invoking the analytic
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expressions within the crowd-anticrowd theory [15, 16]. For our purpose, it is sufficient to
take the value of R(0) from the numerical results at ac = 0.
As the fraction of contrarians increases, the features in the winning outcome series start
to deviate from that of the basic MG (i.e., without the contrarians). In particular, the
anti-persistence of the strategies’ VPs may be destroyed. This will lead to some strategies
with runaway VPs, i.e., VPs that keep on increasing or decreasing in a run. Accompanying
this effect is the emergence of biased conditional probabilities in the winning outcome series.
In the basic MG, the probability of having a winning outcome of 1 following a given history
of k bits (k ≤ m) is equal to that of having a winning outcome of 0 following the same
k-bit history [10]. To illustrate the change in this basic feature of the MG as the fraction of
contrarians increases, we study the quantity [8]
H =
1
Q
∑
µ
[P (0|µ)− P (1|µ)]2, (1)
where the sum is over all the Q possible histories µ of a certain bit-length and P (i|µ) is
the conditional probability of having a winning outcome of i (i=0 or 1) given the history
bit-string is µ. For the basic MG, H = 0 as the two conditional probabilities cancel. We,
therefore, expect that as ac increases, H = 0 in a range of ac for which the contrarians are
too few to affect the outcomes but can efficiently avoid the crowd effect. For large ac, H > 0
as the system becomes increasingly deviated from the anti-persistent behavior. Figure 4
shows the dependence of H for histories of m-bits on the fraction of contrarians, for systems
with m = 2, 3, 4. Interestingly, the range of ac with H = 0 corresponds to the same range
that the success rate of the normal agents is flat (see Fig. 3). The results indicate that the
winning outcomes series has similar features as in the basic MG in this range of small ac,
hence justifying our previous discussion on the small ac behavior. As ac further increases,
H starts to deviate from zero at a m-dependent value of ac for fixed N . This value of
ac increases towards 1/2 for larger N . The result indicates that the contrarians are not
only simply adapting to the actions of the normal agents, but also affecting the outcomes
themselves.
For sufficiently high ac, H = 1, indicating a highly biased conditional probability. Numer-
ically we have checked that in many runs at high ac, the system shows a persistent outcome
(of 1’s or 0’s). For these runs, it is expected (1 − 1/2s)N = 3N/4 agents hold a strategy
that predicts the persistent winning outcome regardless of the value of m in the large N
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limit. It is because the system is now restricted to a tiny portion of the history space and
it is the prediction based only on one particular history bit-string (out of 2m) in a strategy
that really matters [23]. Due to the minority rule, an outcome series of persistent winning
option is not allowed in the absence of contrarians. In the presence of a large fraction of
contrarians in the 3N/4 agents holding strategies with runaway VPs, however, persistent
winning outcomes are allowed. It is because the contrarians take the opposite action to the
prediction of the strategies and leave the room for the normal agents to become winners.
Among the few N(1− ac) normal agents, 3/4 of them win persistently and 1/4 of them lose
persistently. This gives rise to the high averaged success rate (nearly 0.7) for the normal
agents at high ac (see Fig.3). For the Nac contrarians, 1/4 of them persistently take the
winning action as they hold a strategy that persistently predicts a wrong outcome. This
gives rise to the averaged success rate of about 0.25 for the contrarians at high ac, as shown
in Fig.3. If we consider the number of winners collectively, there are 3N
4
(1−ac) winners from
the normal agents and N
4
ac winners from the contrarians per turn. This leads to an overall
success rate of R(ac) = (
3
4
− ac
2
) for sufficiently high ac. From Figs.3 and 4, we notice that
ac > 0.6 corresponds to the high ac regime. The result gives a continuous drop of R as ac
increases towards unity, as observed in Fig.2. For ac = 1, R = 1/4 for runs with persistent
winning outcomes. Note that our argument does not depend on the value ofm, as long as the
number of agents is sufficiently large. In Fig.2, we observed that the results for m = 2, 3, 4
become less sensitive to m in the high ac regime, as predicted. The m = 2 results follow our
prediction reasonably well. The discrepancies from the prediction in the m = 3 and 4 results
come from the small size of system (N = 101) that we used in the numerical simulations,
and the fact that there are runs for which the outcome series is different from a persistent
winning option. For example, it is possible to have a series consisting of alternating winning
options in the high ac regime. However, the discussion based on outcomes with persistent
winning option does capture the essential underlying physics embedded in the numerical
results.
In Fig.2, R(ac) shows a peak at a m-dependent crossover value ac. This value is also
found to increase towards 1/2 as N increases. Following our discussions on the small ac and
high ac regimes, we may estimate ac by approximating it to be the value of ac at which the
small ac behavior crosses over to the high ac behavior, without considering the details of the
intermediate regime. Thus, ac can be determined by R(0) + ac(1 − 2R(0)) = 3/4 − ac/2,
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giving ac = 1/2 in the limit of large N . The m-dependence on ac comes from the finite size
of N = 101 agents in the systems that we used in numerical simulations. For finite N , the
rapid increase in the strategy pool size leads to a rapid drop in overlap of strategies among
the agents as m increases. This has the effects of suppressing the range of ac in which the
behavior in the small ac regime is valid and enlarging the range of intermediate ac where
the system takes on complicated paths in the history space other than the Eulerean trail in
small ac and the highly restricted path to a small portion of the history space at high ac.
IV. SUMMARY
We proposed and studied a generalized minority game consisting of a fraction of contrar-
ians. These contrarians prefer to hold an opposite opinion to the commons or the normal
agents. Within the context of MG, the contrarians are assumed to always take the opposite
action as predicted by their momentarily best-performing strategy. For small fraction of
contrarians, the winning outcomes are dominated by the normal agents and the contrarians
can systematically outperform the normal agents by avoiding the crowd effect and hence
the losing turns of the normal agents. This leads to an enhanced overall success rate of the
system at small ac. However, a larger fraction of contrarians will alter the features in the
outcome winning series, as compared to the basic MG. The results indicate that at high
fraction of contrarians, the few normal agents have a substantively higher success rate than
the contrarians. This is related to the change from anti-persistent to runaway behavior in
strategy performance, as ac increases. This change in character leads to a non-monotonic
dependence of the average success rate among all agents as a function of ac. The small
ac behavior can be understood within the crowd effect in MG and the high ac behavior is
dominated by the runs with persistent winning outcomes. Analytic expressions were given
for both the small ac and high ac regimes. In the limit of large N , it is expected that the
crossover between the two regimes occurs at ac = 1/2.
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FIGURE CAPTIONS
Figure 1: (a) The averaged success rate R and (b) the averaged standard deviation σ, as
a function of the history bit-length m based on which agents decide. Numerical results for
different fractions of contrarians ac = 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0 are shown in different
symbols.
Figure 2: The average success rate R as a function of the fraction of contrarians ac, for
different values of m = 2, 3, and 4.
Figure 3: The averaged success rates R of the normal agents and of the contrarians as a
function of the fraction of contrarians ac. The results are for the case of m = 2.
Figure 4: The quantity H as a function of the fraction of contrarians ac for m = 2, 3, and
4. For a range of small ac, H = 0 showing that the outcome winning series is dominated
by the normal agents. For high ac, H = 1 indicating that the anti-persistent nature of the
system has been disturbed by the presence of contrarians.
11
2 4 6 8 10 12
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
2 4 6 8 10 12
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
R
m
Figure 1
(b)
(a)
σ
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
m=2
m=3
m=4
ac
R
Figure 2
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
contrarians
normal agents
ac
Figure 3
R
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
m=2
m=3
m=4
a c
H
Figure 4
